Phony Science Should Stay Off the Bench

Ross Marchand

November 17, 2026

Too often, justice is blind to phony “scientific” claims that would never withstand scrutiny by actual experts. Put a supposed professional on the stand, add technical language and a few charts, and jurors may assume that a scientific conclusion has already been validated. But an (often flimsy) resume and jargon are no substitute for reliable evidence, which needs to be evaluated according to established scientific principles. Federal judges have a responsibility to keep speculative testimony from becoming the basis for enormous verdicts or wrongful convictions.

That responsibility is written into Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Before expert testimony reaches jurors, the party offering it must show that it is more likely than not helpful, supported by sufficient facts, based on reliable methods, and reliably applied to the particular case. Under Rule 104(a), the judge—not the jury—decides these preliminary admissibility questions.

Yet courts have repeatedly blurred that line. Some judges have treated flaws in an expert’s factual foundation or application of a method as matters merely affecting the testimony’s “weight,” to be sorted out through cross-examination. That approach allows a jury to hear conclusions before a court determines whether the science actually supports them. It can also pressure defendants into settlements rather than risk a verdict influenced by impressive-sounding speculation.

The problem became so persistent that Rule 702 was amended in 2023. The Advisory Committee expressly criticized decisions that relegated fundamental reliability questions to the jury. Its clarification was not an invitation to exclude every disputed opinion. However, it was a reminder that the party presenting an expert must first satisfy the rule’s requirements by a preponderance of the evidence.

Recent appellate decisions demonstrate why this matters. In 2025, the Ninth Circuit held in Engilis v. Monsanto that Rule 702 creates no presumption favoring expert testimony. The court emphasized that judges cannot delegate their gatekeeping responsibilities to jurors. The case involved a proposed causation opinion in litigation over Monsanto’s Roundup herbicide, where the trial court excluded the expert testimony as unreliable. Regardless of views about the product or the company, causation cannot be established merely by placing a confident expert before a jury.

The battle over admissibility heated up again in the Seventh Circuit case Johnson v. Ridge Tool Manufacturing, decided in 2026. The court highlighted the amended rule and explained that trial judges must do more than recite conclusory statements about admissibility. A meaningful examination of the expert’s reasoning is essential, and judges retain discretion when they actually undertake that examination.

Later that month, the D.C. Circuit in Hargrove v. MedStar upheld exclusion of a medical causation opinion that failed Rule 702’s reliability demands. The opinion reaffirmed that a judge must evaluate the intellectual rigor connecting an expert’s methodology to a conclusion, rather than assume professional credentials fill the gaps.

These are not isolated legal disputes; they speak to a broader debate playing out in courtrooms across the country over the need for sounder science in trials. A May 2026 analysis in the Cornell Law Review by scholars Daniel Capra and Liesa Richter reviewed published district court decisions from the amendment’s first year. The authors found substantial progress, but also continuing reliance on outdated precedents that could result in opinions inconsistent with the current, much-improved rule. Their findings suggest that changing the rule’s wording was only the beginning of a needed movement away from phony science in court cases.

Courts should require a clear explanation of each expert’s data, method, assumptions, and connection between evidence and conclusion. They should hold focused admissibility hearings when necessary and explain their reasoning on the record. Appellate courts, meanwhile, should continue correcting decisions that confuse a jury’s role in weighing admissible evidence with a judge’s threshold duty to screen unreliable opinions.

Sound science deserves its day in court. Protecting jurors from unreliable expert testimony is not hostility toward science; it is respect for science—and for the people whose livelihoods and liberty may depend on the right verdict.